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Abstract
This paper studies how ﬁscal policy aﬀects credit market conditions. First, it conducts a FAVAR
analysis showing that the credit spread responds negatively to an expansionary government
spending shock, while consumption, investment, and lending increase. Second, it illustrates that
these results are not mimicked by a DSGE model where the credit spread is endogenized via the
inclusion of a banking sector exploiting lending relationships. Third, it demonstrates that intro-
ducing deep habits in private and government consumption makes the model able to replicate
empirics. Sensitivity checks and extensions show that core results hold for a number of model
calibrations and speciﬁcations. The presence of banks exploiting lending relationships generates
a ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect in the transmission of ﬁscal shocks.
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1 Introduction
During the Great Moderation the mainstream business cycle literature assigned a rather limited
role to ﬁscal policy as a stabilizing tool. It was argued that ﬁscal policy was either ineﬀective 
on the grounds of Ricardian equivalence arguments  or inherently not timely, due to its intrinsic
design and implementation lags combined with the typical short length of recessions. As output
and inﬂation showed a small variability and monetary policy was able to maintain both price and
output gap stability, any policy instrument other than the monetary policy rate was considered to
play only a minor role (Blanchard et al., 2010).
As the recent crisis began, governments around the world shared serious concerns because: (i)
the crisis was taking a global and profound dimension; (ii) it was expected to be long-lasting; and
(iii) the monetary policy interest rate had almost reached its limits as in many cases, including the
US and the UK, it was soon eﬀectively at the zero lower bound. As a result, ﬁscal policy was at
least a dimension along which governments could do more. Indeed, the ﬁscal stimulus provided by
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was described as `the boldest countercyclical
ﬁscal action in American history' (Romer, 2009, p. 5).
Another important feature of the latest crisis was the role that the banking sector had in mag-
nifying the eﬀects of the crisis itself. It is a well-established fact in the empirical literature that the
credit spread, i.e. the diﬀerence between the loan rate and the deposit rate, widens during down-
turns (Gertler and Lown, 1999; Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero, 2010; Villa and Yang, 2011). Following
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the spread skyrocketed. Lenza et al. (2010) reported that the
spread between unsecured deposit rates (EURIBOR) and overnight indexed swap (OIS) rates at the
three-month maturity approached 200 basis points in the Euro Area. Analogous spreads were even
higher in the US and UK. Recent empirical evidence shows that the contraction in the supply of
credit to ﬁrms contributed signiﬁcantly to the decline in the GDP growth during the ﬁnancial crisis
(Ciccarelli et al., 2010).
The literature oﬀers a variety of studies focusing on the behavior of the credit spread over the
business cycle. In particular, Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010) provide empirical evidence that banks
hold up borrowers, because the former gain an information monopoly over customers' creditwor-
thiness and the latter ﬁnd it costly to switch to a new funding source. This piece of evidence agrees
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with the analysis of Santos and Winton (2008), who empirically show that during recessions banks
raise their lending margins more for bank-dependent borrowers than for those with access to public
bond markets because of the informational hold-up eﬀect rather than a greater risk of the ﬁrst type
of borrowers. On the contrary, in expansions, banks have the incentive to lower their mark-up (the
credit spread) in order to expand their customer base and charge them higher mark-up in the future,
once they have been held-up. On the theoretical side, these empirical regularities are matched in
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models featuring lending relationships by Aksoy
et al. (2009) and Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010). While the latter study the ﬁnancial accelerator
role of countercyclical credit spreads as a propagation mechanism in a Real Business Cycle (RBC)
model, the former build a New Keynesian (NK) model with staggered prices and cost channels to
study the implications of lending relationships for monetary policy making. In these models lending
relationships are introduced via the modeling device that ﬁrms form deep habits in their borrowing
decision, in a way analogous to households decision in Ravn et al. (2006). Such a device represents
a reduced-form tool to incorporate the borrower's hold-up problem into the model. In fact, the out-
come of this mechanism is that ﬁrms are held up in lending relationships, which can be strategically
exploited by banks.
In the literature, there is no direct investigation on the relationship between the ﬁscal stimulus
and credit spreads. This paper attempts to ﬁll in this gap on one hand by estimating the response of
a number of measures of the credit spread to a government spending expansion in a factor augmented
vector auto-regressive (FAVAR) model of the US economy. On the other hand, it develops a DSGE
model with lending relationships and ﬁscal policy able (i) to match the empirical ﬁndings, and (ii)
to provide a theoretical framework that allows one to study how the ﬁscal stimulus is transmitted
via the banking sector.
The estimated impulse responses from the FAVAR provide evidence that the credit spread falls
in response to a government spending expansion, while consumption, investment, and lending in-
crease. The paper shows that the ﬂexible-price RBC model and its sticky-price NK extension, both
augmented with lending relationships, predict the opposite. However, when the model also incorpo-
rates deep habits in consumption, the picture considerably changes, as the negative response of the
credit spread can now be matched. As also explored by Cantore et al. (2011), the model with deep
habits in consumption also matches a series of ﬁndings documented by some of the recent empirical
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literature. In particular, private consumption is crowded in by government spending (Blanchard
and Perotti, 2002; Galí et al., 2007; Pappa, 2009; Monacelli et al., 2010; Fragetta and Melina, 2011),
the increase in hours worked due to the ﬁscal expansion is accompanied by a boost in real wages
(Pappa, 2005; Galí et al., 2007; Caldara and Kamps, 2008; Pappa, 2009; Fragetta and Melina, 2011),
and the price mark-up drops (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008; Canova and Pappa, 2011).
The diﬀerence in the transmission mechanism between canonical models and models featuring
deep habits in consumption lies in the behavior of the price mark-up. In both classes of models, an
expansionary government spending shock triggers a negative wealth eﬀect caused by the absorption
of resources that makes consumption, leisure and investment less aﬀordable. When deep habits in
consumption are activated even under ﬂexible prices, an expansionary government spending shock
curbs the price mark-up. This translates into a rise in labor demand stronger than the rise in labor
supply and into a larger rise in the demand for investment. The subsequent increase in the real wage
triggers a strong substitution eﬀect away from leisure and into consumption, hence the crowding-in
of the latter. Banks face a rise in the demand for loans and this raises the loan rate. However, they
also incorporate the information of high future returns on capital and hence their ability of making
high future proﬁts. At this point, lending relationships come into play: banks are willing to give up
some of the current proﬁts to expand their customer base by locking in more customers. This results
into a fall of the credit spread and an expansion of equilibrium lending. As a result, the presence of
banks exploiting lending relationships generates a ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect in the transmission of
the government spending shock.
This transmission mechanism is ﬁrstly analyzed in a ﬂexible-price benchmark model with lump-
sum taxation and a balanced government budget. Robustness checks and extensions show that core
results hold for a number of calibrations and speciﬁcations. In particular the paper analyzes: (i)
the introduction of government debt and distortionary taxation; (ii) the sensitivity of the results to
parameter values governing deep in habits in consumption and in lending; and (iii) a NK extension
of the model with sticky prices.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical estimates.
Section 3 illustrates the model. Section 4 describes the calibration. Section 5 presents the results in
the ﬂexible-price benchmark. Section 6 presents robustness checks and extensions. Finally, Section
7 concludes.
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2 Empirical evidence
The empirical literature provides evidence of counter-cyclical credit spreads (Gertler and Lown, 1999;
Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero, 2010, among others), but does not cover the more speciﬁc issue of how
credit spreads react to ﬁscal policy shocks. This section attempts to ﬁll in this gap by estimating
the response of the credit spread to a government spending shock in a FAVAR model of the US
economy:  Yt
Ft
 = A (L)
 Yt−1
Ft−1
+ vt, (1)
where Yt is a M × 1 vector of observed variables, Ft is a K × 1 vector of unobserved factors, A (L)
is a conformable polynomial in the lag operator and vt is an error term.
The estimation employs quarterly US data over the period 1954q1-2007q4. The starting date
avoids the years from 1945 to the Korean war, considered to be turbulent from a ﬁscal point of view
(see Perotti, 2007, for a discussion). The end date falls before the start of the great recession.
Vector Yt contains the baseline Blanchard-Perotti variables  the log of real per-capita total
spending; the log of real per-capita output; and the log of real per-capita net taxes  to which
measures of the credit spread are added one at a time. Government spending (BEA NIPA table 3.1,
line 16) and net taxes exclude social transfers in order to remove most of the automatic stabilizer
component. Net taxes are obtained as government current receipts (BEA NIPA table 3.1, line 1)
less current transfers (line 17) and interest payments (line 22). The series are transformed in real
per-capita terms by dividing their nominal values by the GDP deﬂator and the civilian population.
The measure of the credit spread included in the baseline speciﬁcation of model (1) is computed
as the diﬀerence between the three-month bank prime loan rate (BPLR) and the quarterly Treasury
bill rate (TBR). The choice of this particular spread is suggested by the type of lending relationships
analyzed in this paper, i.e. bank-ﬁrm relationships. As a robustness check, the model is nevertheless
estimated also with three alternative measures of the credit spread: (i) Moody's seasoned Baa
corporate bond yield (Baa) minus Moody's seasoned Aaa corporate bond yield (Aaa); (ii) Baa
minus long-term Treasury constant maturity rate (TCMR); and ﬁnally (iii) Aaa minus TCMR.1
1Moody's Aaa and Baa corporate bond yields include bonds with remaining maturities as close as possible to 30
years. Moody's drops bonds if the remaining life falls below 20 years. The long-term Treasury constant maturity rate
for the largest part of the observations refers to bonds with a maturity of 30 years. Missing values are ﬁlled in with
the 20-year Treasury constant maturity rate. The two series are nevertheless virtually coincident for the periods in
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Number Eigenvalue % of variance explained Cumulative %
1 3.87 77.33 77.33
2 1.06 21.19 98.52
3 0.05 0.91 99.43
4 0.02 0.49 99.92
5 0.00 0.09 1.00
Table 1: Principal components analysis
The unobserved factors Ft are related to a N × 1 vector Xt of potentially relevant observed
variables by:
Xt = ΛFt + et, (2)
where Ft are estimated as the principal components of the correlation matrix of the Xt, and et is
a vector of error terms. Following common practice, the loadings Λ are identiﬁed as eigenvectors
(see Bernanke et al., 2005; Laganà and Mountford, 2005; Smith and Zoega, 2009, among others).
Vector Xt contains a number of macroeconomic variables that, together with the variables collected
in Yt, makes the empirical model closer to the theoretical model presented in the next section. In
particular, Xt includes standardized values of (i) the log of real per-capita private consumption; (ii)
the log of per-capita hours of work (the series constructed by Francis and Ramey (2009) and available
on Valerie Ramey's webpage); (iii) the log real per-capita private domestic investment; (iv) the log of
real per-capita lending;2 and (v) the log of the real hourly wage (average hourly wage of production
workers produced by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics).3 Table 1 reports the eigenvalues associated
to the principal components of Xt and the proportion of total variance explained. In model (1) the
ﬁrst two components are included as these cumulatively explain almost 99% of total variance.
Government spending shocks are identiﬁed by using the assumption proposed by Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) that government spending is unable to react to output and other shocks within a
quarter due to implementation and decision lags typical of the budgeting process. If identiﬁcation is
which both of them are available.
2As in Christiano et al. (2010), total lending is the sum of total credit market instruments from the liabilities
side of the balance sheet of nonfarm nonﬁnancial corporate business and total credit market instruments from the
liabilities side of the balance sheet of nonfarm noncorporate business.
3GDP, the GDP deﬂator, the interest rates used to compute the measures of the credit spread, private consumption,
investment and lending are extracted from the ALFRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. All series
are seasonally adjusted by the source. Following the ﬁscal VAR literature, model (1) is estimated using the levels of the
variables. Hence, also principal components are extracted from the levels of the observables. Bai and Ng (2004) and
Banerjee and Marcellino (2009) show that, even if observables are trended principal components can be consistently
estimated provided that they cointegrate with observables. Johansen cointegration rank tests ﬁnd cointegration at
conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
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achieved via a Choleski decomposition, this assumption translates into ordering government spending
ﬁrst. The same approach to identiﬁcation has been employed by Monacelli et al. (2010).
After estimating the reduced form of the FAVAR, including four lags of the endogenous variables
and a constant, its structural representation and correspondent identiﬁcation of the structural shocks
is obtained via a Choleski triangularization, as already discussed. To achieve this, the variables are
ordered as follows: (i) government spending; (ii) output; (iii) taxes; (iv) the factors; and (v) credit
spread. Ordering taxes third is justiﬁed by the fact that the tax revenue is immediately (within
the quarter) aﬀected by shocks to output; while ordering the credit spread last allows it to be con-
temporaneously aﬀected by all structural shocks, including those coming from consumption/saving
decisions and labor market conditions captured by the factors.4
Figure 1 plots the impulse responses of the endogenous variables of the FAVAR to a positive
shock to government spending in a forty-quarter horizon. The impulse responses of the variables
underlying the factors are derived from the responses of the factors themselves and by exploiting
equation (2) and the estimated loadings.5 The responses of output, net taxes, private consumption,
private investment and lending are positive and generally signiﬁcant at a 90% level. While hours
worked react positively to a government expenditure expansion, the real wage response is mildly
negative on impact and then increases, though not signiﬁcantly, as in the SVAR estimates reported
by Galí et al. (2007). All measures of the credit spread barely move on impact or experience a
slight positive (though not signiﬁcant) increase. After a quarter, however, BPLR-TBR, Baa-Aaa
and Baa-TCMR fall and remain below baseline for several quarters. Aaa-TCMR experiences an
initial signiﬁcant decline but it quickly returns to baseline. The peak response of all measures of the
credit spread is negative and signiﬁcant.
The same analysis is replicated over the more recent subsample 1980q12007q4 and the associated
impulse response functions are plotted in Figure 2. In general results are qualitatively similar, though
the increase in real output, private consumption, investment and lending following the government
4As a robustness check alternative variable orderings are used in the Choleski decomposition  namely ordering the
factors before output; and/or swapping output with taxes; and/or ordering the measures of the credit spread before
output  obtaining only negligible diﬀerences with respect to the impulse responses reported.
5In ﬁgures 1 and 2 the impulse responses of the endogenous variables in the baseline FAVAR containing spread
BPLR-TBR are reported. The responses of the other measures of the credit spread are obtained by estimating
FAVARs including one alternative measure of the credit spread at a time. The responses of the other endogenous
variables obtained from the alternative FAVAR speciﬁcations are not reported as these are virtually coincident to the
responses obtained from the baseline FAVAR.
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Figure 1: Estimated impulse responses from the FAVAR over the full sample (1954q12007q4) to
a one-standard deviation shock to government spending (shaded areas represent 90% conﬁdence
intervals).
expenditure expansion is shorter-lived. As far as the responses of the credit spreads are concerned,
results are generally robust to the sample change. In particular, the baseline measure BPLR-TBR
reacts negatively and signiﬁcantly also on impact, while measure Aaa-TCMR, after an impact fall,
experiences a temporary not signiﬁcant increase before falling again signiﬁcantly below baseline. All
credit spread measures exhibit a negative and signiﬁcant peak also in the more recent subsamble.
In recent years the empirical literature has debated a great deal on which identiﬁcation schemes
should be used to analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. Among others, Ramey (2009)
and Mertens and Ravn (2011) criticize the Blanchard-Perotti (BP) approach on the grounds that it
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Figure 2: Estimated impulse responses from the FAVAR over the a subsample (1980q12007q4)
to a one-standard deviation shock to government spending (shaded areas represent 90% conﬁdence
intervals).
fails to take into account anticipation eﬀects, and advocate the use of the narrative approach, which
instead uses dummy variables to isolate episodes of discretionary ﬁscal policy, such as military build-
ups or changes in the tax system. Mertens and Ravn (2011), on one hand show that anticipation
eﬀects may invalidate structural VAR (SVAR) estimates of impulse responses; on the other hand
they also show that anticipation eﬀects generally do not overturn the existing ﬁndings from the ﬁscal
SVAR literature, largely employing the BP approach.
Nevertheless, in order to address at least partially the issue of anticipation of government expen-
diture shocks, the FAVAR is estimated also including  as exogenous variables  the Ramey-Shapiro
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Figure 3: Sensitivity to the introduction of the Ramey-Shapiro (RS) dummy: estimated mean
impulse responses from the FAVAR over the full sample (1954q12007q4) to a one-standard deviation
shock to government spending (1 RS = 1 dummy (0-4 lags) taking value one on each RS episode; 3
RS = 1 separate dummy (0-4 lags) for each of the 3 RS episodes in the sample).
(RS) episodes in the forms of either (i) 1 RS, as Edelberg et al. (1999), Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2005), and Ramey (2009), i.e. lags zero to four of the RS dummy variable that takes value one in
those quarters in which large military build-ups took place in the US, making expenditure shocks
anticipated (1965q1, escalation of the Vietnam war; 1980q1, Carter-Regan military build-up upon
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; 2001q3, 9/11 attack); or (ii) 3 RS, as in Perotti (2007)6 and
Monacelli et al. (2010), lags zero to four of each of three separate dummy variables isolating the
same episodes. Mean impulse responses are plotted in Figure 3. To a certain extent, compared to
the baseline speciﬁcation, the addition of the RS dummies alters the dynamics or the magnitude of
6Perotti (2007) allows the responses to each RS episode to have both a diﬀerent intensity and a diﬀerent shape.
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the impulse responses estimated from the FAVAR. However, the signs of the impulse responses are
preserved and quantitative diﬀerences are generally small.
In sum, this section provides evidence that in post-WWII US data a government spending
expansion boosts lending alongside private consumption and investment and triggers a fall  that is
generally delayed  of the credit spread.
3 Model
This section presents the DSGE model. The economy is populated by: (i) households; (ii) the
government; (iii) entrepreneurs; (iv) ﬁnal good ﬁrms; and (v) banks. Households consume, save
by choosing deposits and government bonds, and supply labor. Consumption and wage income
are taxed by the government. Households exhibit habits at the level of each variety of private
and government consumption goods, i.e deep habits, as in Ravn et al. (2006). The government
allocates spending over the varieties of consumption goods, issues bonds and raises tax revenues. Its
expenditures include government purchases and lump-sum transfers to households. Entrepreneurs
borrow from banks to produce a homogeneous wholesale output sold in a perfectly competitive
market. They minimize their borrowing costs by choosing their demand for loans and exhibit
deep habits in lending following Aksoy et al. (2009) and Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010). This
represents a reduced form way to incorporate the eﬀects of informational asymmetries on borrowers'
creditworthiness into a DSGE model. In fact, banks can be thought of accumulating this information
by repeatedly lending to their customers and earning an informational monopoly that creates a
borrower's hold-up eﬀect. In other words, it becomes costly for borrowers to switch lenders as
they should start the signaling process again. The deep habits framework is not a formal setup of
asymmetric information, but it is still a useful and tractable way to replicate the borrower's hold-up
eﬀect. In addition, entrepreneurs maximize the ﬂow of discounted proﬁts by choosing the quantity
of factors for production. Final goods ﬁrms buy the wholesale good from entrepreneurs, diﬀerentiate
it and sell it in a monopolistically competitive market. Banks maximize the expected discounted
value of lifetime proﬁts by choosing deposits and the loan rate. Their balance sheet features loans
on the assets side and deposits on the liabilities side. In the sticky-price version of the model a
monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor rule.
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3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ (0, 1). Each household's
preferences are represented by the following intertemporal utility function:
U j0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U (Xct )
j , 1−Hjt
]
, (3)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and Hjt is labor supply in terms of hours worked. Total time
available to households is normalized to unity, thus 1−Hjt represents leisure time. Following Ravn
et al. (2006), (Xct )
j is a habit-adjusted consumption composite of diﬀerentiated goods indexed by
i ∈ (0, 1):
(Xct )
j =
[ˆ 1
0
(Cjit − θScit−1)1−
1
η di
] 1
1− 1η
, (4)
where η is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, θ is the degree of deep habits in consumption,
Cjit is the real consumption expenditure at time t, and S
c
it−1 denotes the stock of external habits,
which evolves as:
Scit = %S
c
it−1 + (1− %)Cit, (5)
and % measures the habit persistence. Such a form of consumption externality is also known as
catching up with the Joneses good by good.
Household j solves a two-stage optimization problem. First, they minimize total expenditure,
´ 1
0 PitC
j
itdi, subject to equation (4). The optimal level of consumption for each variety for a given
composite is then given by:
Cjit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
(Xct )
j + θScit−1, (6)
where Pt ≡
[´ 1
0 P
1−η
it di
] 1
1−η
is the nominal price index . At the optimum, using equation (6) and the
deﬁnition of nominal price index, the nominal value of the habit-adjusted consumption composite
can be written as:
Pt (X
c
t )
j =
ˆ 1
0
Pit
(
Cjit − θScit−1
)
di. (7)
The second stage of households' optimization problem consists in the maximization of utility
subject to the budget constraint. Household j's actual consumption expenditure at time t, Cjt , is
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obtained by rearranging equation (7):
Cjt = (X
c
t )
j + θ
ˆ 1
0
Pit
Pt
Scit−1di.︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Ωjt
(8)
The representative household enters period t with Djt units of real deposits in the bank; and real
government bonds Bjt . During period t, the household chooses to consume C
j
t , which is taxed at
the sales tax rate, τ ct ; supplies H
j
t hours of work; and allocates savings in (i) deposits at the bank,
Djt+1, that pay the net interest rate R
D
t+1 between t and t + 1; and in (ii) government bonds B
j
t+1,
that pay RBt+1 between t and t+ 1.
Each period the representative household gains an hourly wage,W jt ; dividend payments,
´ 1
0 Πitdi,
from ﬁnal goods ﬁrms and
´ 1
0 Πbtdb from banks. Labor income is taxed at rate τ
w
t . In addition, the
government grants transfers, TRt, and imposes real lump-sum taxes, Tt. The household's intertem-
poral budget constraint can thus be expressed as:
(1 + τ ct )((X
c
t )
j + Ωjt ) +D
j
t+1 +B
j
t+1 ≤ (1− τwt )WtHjt + (1 +RDt )Djt
+
(
1 +RBt
)
Bjt +
ˆ 1
0
Πitdi+
ˆ 1
0
Πbtdb+ TRt − Tt, (9)
where inequality (9) uses equation (8), i.e. that Ωjt = θ
´ 1
0
Pit
Pt
Scit−1di and C
j
t = (X
c
t )
j + Ωjt .
Maximization yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to (Xct )
j , Djt+1, B
j
t+1 and
Hjt :
U jXt = λ
j
t (1 + τ
c
t ), (10)
Et[Λ
j
t+1(1 +R
D
t+1)] = 1, (11)
Et[Λ
j
t+1
(
1 +RBt+1
)
] = 1, (12)
−U jHt = (1− τwt )λjtWt, (13)
where λjt is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint and Λt,t+1 ≡ βEt
[
λt+1
λt
]
is
the stochastic discount factor.
Equations (11) and (12) imply a non-arbitrage condition between the interest rate on deposits
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and government bonds.
3.2 Government
Following Ravn et al. (2006) deep habits are present also in government consumption. This can
be justiﬁed by assuming that households form habits also on consumption of government-provided
goods. In each period t, the government allocates spending PtGt over diﬀerentiated goods sold by
retailers in a monopolistic market to maximize the quantity of a habit-adjusted composite good:
Xgt =
[ˆ 1
0
(Git − θSgit−1)1−
1
η di
] 1
1− 1η
, (14)
subject to the budget constraint
´ 1
0 PitGit ≤ PtGt, where Sgit−1 denotes the stock of habits for
government expenditures, which evolves as:
Sgit = %S
g
it−1 + (1− %)Git. (15)
At the optimum:
Git =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Xgt + θS
g
it−1. (16)
Aggregate real government consumption Gt evolves as an autoregressive process:
log
(
Gt
G¯
)
= ρG log
(
Gt−1
G¯
)
+ gt , (17)
where G¯ is the steady-state level of government spending ρG is an autoregressive parameter, and 
g
t
is a mean zero, i.i.d. random shock with standard deviation σG. Two scenarios are considered: (i)
balanced budget; (ii) debt ﬁnancing. In the ﬁrst case, government spending is simply set equal to
lump-sum taxes. In the latter case, the government budget constraint will read as follows:
Bt+1 = R
B
t Bt +Gt + TRt − Tt − τ ct Ct − τwt WtHt, (18)
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while all tax instruments are set according to the following feedback rule, following Leeper et al.
(2010):
log
(
Xt
X¯
)
= ρX log
(
Xt−1
X¯
)
+ ρXB
Bt−1
Yt−1
+ Xt , Xt = (T, τ
c, τw), (19)
where ρX are autoregressive coeﬃcients; X¯ are steady state values; 
X
t are serially uncorrelated, nor-
mally distributed shocks with zero mean and standard deviations σX , and ρXB is the responsiveness
of instruments X to the debt-to-GDP ratio.
3.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are distributed over a unit interval and indexed by e ∈ (0, 1). They borrow from
banks to produce a homogeneous wholesale output that they sell in a perfectly competitive market.
Entrepreneurs solve two optimization problems: an intratemporal problem, giving rise to lending
relationships, in which they decide the composition of their loan demand; and an intertemporal
problem in which they maximize the ﬂow of discounted proﬁts by choosing the quantity of factors
for production.
The intratemporal problem can be thought of being solved by the ﬁnancial department of each
ﬁrm e, which decides how much to borrow from each bank b given its overall loan demand. Following
Aksoy et al. (2009) and Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010), lending relationships arise due to the
presence of deep habits in lending. Such a device represents a reduced-form tool to incorporate the
borrower's hold-up problem into the model. In fact, the outcome of this mechanism is that ﬁrms are
held up in lending relationships, which can be strategically exploited by banks. Santos and Winton
(2008) and Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010) ﬁnd empirical evidence that banks hold up borrowers,
because the former gain an information monopoly over customers' creditworthiness and the latter
ﬁnd it costly to switch to a new funding source. From a technical point of view, the problem is
analogous to the intratemporal problem solved by households when they feature deep habits in
consumption. The optimization problem consists in the following:
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min
Lebt
ˆ 1
0
(1 +RLbt)L
e
bt, (20)
s.t.
[ˆ 1
0
(Lebt − θLSLbt−1)1−
1
ηL db
]1/(1− 1
ηL
)
=
(
XLt
)e
, (21)
SLbt = %
LSLbt−1 + (1− %L)Lbt, (22)
where RLbt is the net lending rate, L
e
bt is the demand by ﬁrm e for loans issued by bank b, θ
L is
the degree of habit in lending, SLbt is the stock of (external) habit in lending, η
L is the elasticity of
substitution across varieties of loans,
(
XLt
)e
is the demand for loans by ﬁrm e augmented by lending
relationships and %L is the persistence of lending relationships. Equation (20) represents overall
lending expenditure; equation (21) imposes deep habits in lending; and (22) imposes persistence in
the stock of habit as in Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010).
The solution to the above problem yields ﬁrm e's demand for loans from bank b:
Lebt =
(
1 +RLbt
1 +RLt
)−ηL (
XLt
)e
+ θLSLbt−1, (23)
where (1 +RLt ) is the price index for the loan composite and corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier
attached to constraint (21) as standard with the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
Entrepreneur e faces also an intertemporal problem by solving which she chooses capital Ket+1
and employment Het to maximize the expected discounted value of its lifetime proﬁts. Recalling
that in this economy ﬁrms are owned by households, the stochastic discount factor of the former,
Λt,t+1, is given by the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the latter. The intertemporal
optimization problem is summarized by the following:
max
Het ,K
e
t+1
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s
 Φt+sF (K
e
t+s, H
e
t+s)−Wt+sHet+s − Iet+s
+
(
XLt+s
)e − ´ 10 (1 +RLbt+s)Lebt+sdb+ Ξet+s
 , (24)
s.t. Ket+1 = I
e
t + (1− δ)Ket , (25)ˆ 1
0
Lebt+1db ≥ Iet +WtHet . (26)
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Equation (24) is the sum of discounted proﬁts expressed in terms of net cash ﬂows. F (Ket , h
e
t ) is
an increasing and concave production function in capital and labor, Φt is the competitive real price
at which the wholesale output is sold, WtH
e
t is the wage bill, I
e
t is the expenditure in investment
goods, Ξet ≡ θL
´ 1
0
1+Rbt
1+Rt
SLbt−1db such that
(
XLt
)e
+ Ξet =
´ 1
0 L
e
btdb = L
e
t , i.e. the amount of loans
that ﬂow into the entrepreneur's balance sheet, while
´ 1
0 (1 + R
L
bt)L
e
btdb represents what they repay
to banks. Equation (25) is a standard law of motion of capital, which depreciates at rate δ, while
constraint (26) makes it necessary for ﬁrms to borrow from banks in order to ﬁnance investment
expenditure and the wage bill. The latter represents a ﬁnancing constraint needed for external
credit to play a role in the model. Without the imposition of this constraint, ﬁrms would always
ﬁnd it optimal to satisfy their ﬁnancing needs via internal funds. Thus (26) holds with equality in
equilibrium.7 Investment Iet is also a composite of diﬀerentiated goods but it is not subject to deep
habit formation: Iet =
[´ 1
0 (I
e
it)
1− 1
η di
] 1
1− 1η . Expenditure minimisation leads to the optimal level of
demand of investment goods for each variety i:
Ieit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Iet . (27)
Substituting for equations (25) and (26) into (24) and taking the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect
to Het and K
e
t+1 lead to the following
ΦtFH,t = WtEt
[
Λt,t+1(1 +R
L
t+1)
]
, (28)
Et
[
Λt,t+1(1 +R
L
t+1)
]
= EtΛt,t+1
[
Φt+1FK,t+1 + Λt,t+2(1 +R
L
t+2)(1− δ)
]
. (29)
Condition (28) equates the real value of the marginal product of labor to the cost of the marginal
hour of work, which in turn depends on the real wage and the expected lending rate. Condition (29)
equates the expected cost of borrowing one unit of capital to its expected beneﬁt at the margin.
The latter, in turn, incorporates (i) the expected real value of the marginal product of capital; and
(ii) the expected marginal saving deriving from not having to borrow fraction (1− δ) of capital one
period ahead. The real price Φt represents the shadow value of output and hence, given perfect
7Inequality (26) introduces the cost channel of both labor and investment in a reduced-form way. The labor cost
channel has been introduced by Christiano et al. (2005), among others, while the investment cost channel is a feature
of ﬁnancial accelerator models, such as Bernanke et al. (1999).
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competition in the wholesale market, it also represents its real marginal cost. The full cost channel
imposed by constraint (26) makes entrepreneurs' equilibrium conditions intertemporal and the real
marginal cost Φt an increasing function of the lending rate.
3.4 Final good ﬁrms
A continuum of ﬁnal good ﬁrms i ∈ (0, 1) buy the wholesale good from entrepreneurs at the real
price Φt, diﬀerentiate it and sell it in a monopolistically competitive market at price Pit. Price
stickiness is introduced in the model as in Rotemberg (1982), i.e. by assuming that changing prices
costs resources. In particular, it is assumed that ﬁnal good ﬁrms face quadratic price adjustment
costs ξ2
(
Pit
Pit−1 − 1
)2
, where parameter ξ measures the degree of price stickiness.8 The real price Φt
charged by entrepreneurs in the wholesale competitive market represents also the real marginal cost
common to all ﬁnal good ﬁrms, i.e. MCt = Φt. Final good ﬁrm i chooses Cit+s, S
c
it+s, Git+s, S
g
it+s
and Pit+s to maximize the following ﬂow of discounted proﬁts:
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s
{(
Pit+s
Pit+s−1
−MCt+s
)
(Cit+s + Iit+s +Git+s) +
ξ
2
(
Pit+s
Pit+s−1
− 1
)2}
, (30)
subject to the demand for good i in the form of private consumption Cit, (8), investment Iit, (27),
and government consumption Git, (16), and the laws of motion of the stocks of habit for households,
(5), and the government, (15). This leads to the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
Pit
Pt
−MCt + (1− %)λct = νct , (31)
EtΛt,t+1(θν
c
t+1 + %λ
c
t+1) = λ
c
t , (32)
Pit
Pt
−MCt + (1− %)λgt = νgt , (33)
EtΛt,t+1(θν
g
t+1 + %λ
g
t+1) = λ
g
t , (34)
8The use of price-adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982) is shared by virtually all papers featuring deep habits
in consumption as it is a rather straight-forward addition from a technical point of view.
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Pit
Pt
(Cit +Git)− ξ
(
Pit
Pit+s
− 1
)
Pit
Pit−1
+ (1− η)
(
Pit
Pt
)1−η
It
+ηMCt
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
It − ηνct
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Xct − ηνgt
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Xgt
+ξΛt,t+1
[(
Pit+1
Pit
− 1
)
Pit+1
Pit
]
= 0, (35)
where νct , ν
g
t , λ
c
t andλ
g
t are the Lagrange multipliers on constraints (8), (16), (5) and (15), respec-
tively.
Let MCnt denote the nominal marginal cost. The gross mark-up charged by ﬁnal good ﬁrm i
can be deﬁned as µit ≡ Pit/MCnt = PitPt /
MCnt
Pt
= pit/MCt. In the symmetric equilibrium all ﬁnal
good ﬁrms charge the same price, Pit = Pt, hence the relative price is unity, pit = 1. It follows
that, in the symmetric equilibrium, the mark-up is simply the inverse of the marginal cost. By
combining equations (31), (33) and (35), substituting for the demands for Cit and Git, (6) and (16),
and rearranging, the optimal pricing decision in the symmetric equilibrium can be written as follows:
(Xct +X
g
t + It)
[
1− η
η − 1MCt
]
+
η
η − 1(1− %) [λ
c
tX
c
t + λ
g
tX
g
t ]−
θ
η − 1
(
Sct−1 + S
g
t−1
)
+ξEtΛt,t+1 [Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)]− ξΠt (Πt − 1) = 0, (36)
where Πt ≡ PtPt−1 is the gross inﬂation rate. Note that the third line in pricing equation (36)
disappears when ξ = 0 and prices become fully ﬂexible. Such a restriction is used in Section 5 where
results are analyzed in the ﬂexible-price benchmark.
3.5 Banking sector
The banking sector is borrowed from Aksoy et al. (2009) and Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010). Each
bank b chooses its demand for deposits, Dbt+1, and the loan rate, R
L
bt+1, to maximize the expected
discounted value of its lifetime proﬁts. Banks are owned by households as well; therefore, their
stochastic discount factor, Λt,t+1, is given by the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the
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households. The optimization problem is summarized by the following:
max
Dbt,R
L
bt
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s
{
Dbt+s+1 − Lbt+s+1 + (1 +RLbt+s)Lbt+s − (1 +Rt+s)Dbt+s
}
, (37)
s.t. Lbt = Dbt, (38)
Lbt =
(
1 +RLbt
1 +RLt
)−ηL
XLt + θ
LSLbt−1. (39)
Equation (37) represents the cash ﬂow of the bank in each period, given by the diﬀerence between
deposits and loans and the diﬀerence by earnings on assets, priced at the net rate RLbt, and interest
payments on liabilities. Equation (38) represents the bank's balance sheet, where deposits on the
liabilities side are equal to loans on the asset side. Equation (39) represents the bank-speciﬁc demand
for loans.
Taking the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to Lbt+1 and R
L
bt+1 yields respectively:
νbt = EtΛt,t+s
[(
RLbt+1 −Rt+1
)
+ νbt+1θ
L(1− %L)] , (40)
Et [Λt,t+sLbt+1] = νbtη
LEt
[
XLt+1
]
, (41)
where νbt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with this maximization problem. Equation (40)
states that the shadow value of lending an extra unit in period t is equal to the beneﬁt from the
spread earned on this operation plus the beneﬁt of expected future proﬁts arising from the fact that
a share θL of this lending is held-up at time t+ 1. According to equation (41), the marginal beneﬁt
of increasing the loan rate should be equal to its marginal cost given by the reduced demand for
loans evaluated at the shadow value νbt.
3.6 Monetary authority
When the model features price stickiness (ξ > 0), it is closed with a simple Taylor rule describing
monetary policy setting as in Galí et al. (2007):
log
(
1 +Rnt
1 + R¯n
)
= %pi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
, (42)
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and a Fisher equation:
1 +RBt+1 = Et
[
1 +Rnt
Πt+1
]
, (43)
where Rnt is the nominal interest rate.
3.7 Equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, goods markets, the labor market, the credit market, and bond markets
clear. The symmetric equilibrium consists of an allocation and a sequence of prices and co-state
variables that satisfy the optimality conditions of households, the government, entrepreneurs, ﬁnal
goods ﬁrms and banks; the ﬁscal rules; and the stochastic processes.
The resource constraint completes the model:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +
ξ
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)2
. (44)
Taking a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium system around steady-state values, and
using the Blanchard-Kahn procedure, yields the following state-space solution
sˆt+1 = Φ1sˆt + Φ2t+1, (45)
dˆt = Φ3sˆt, (46)
where vector sˆt includes predetermined and exogenous variables; vector dˆt contains the control
variables; vector t includes all random disturbances; and matrices Φ1, Φ2 and Φ3 contain elements
that depend on the structural parameters of the model.
4 Calibration
To calibrate the model numerical values are assigned to parameters in order to match a number
of stylized facts for the US economy in the post-WWII era. Table 2 summarizes all the parameter
values. The time period in the model corresponds to one quarter in the data.
The utility function U(·) specializes as U(·) = [C
ω
t (1−Ht)1−ω]
1−σ
1−σ , where σ > 1 is the constant
relative risk aversion coeﬃcient and ω is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
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Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025
Production function parameter α 0.66
Risk aversion σ 2
Deep habits in consumption θ 0.86
Consumption habit persistence % 0.85
Deep habits in lending θL 0.72
Pers. of lending relationships %L 0.85
Share of government spending GY 0.20
S.S. sales tax rate τ c 0.05
S.S. labor income tax rate τw 0.24
Persistence of gov spending ρG 0.90
Persistence of tax shocks ρX 0.95
Price stickiness ξ 30
Monetary response to inﬂation %pi 1.5
Preference parameter ω set to target H = 0.44
Elasticity of substitution η set to target µ = 1.20
Elast. of subst. in banking ηL set to target R− r = 0.005
Table 2: Calibration
leisure; while the production function is a standard Cobb-Douglas: F (·) = Hαt K1−αt .
Some parameters are standard in the business cycle literature. In particular, the subjective
discount factor, β, is equal to 0.99, the capital depreciation rate, δ, to 0.025, the production function
parameter, α, to 0.66 and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, σ, to 2.
The consumption deep habits parameters, θ and %, are equal to 0.86 and 0.85, following the
estimates used by Ravn et al. (2006). The parameter representing deep habits in lending relation-
ships, θL, is set equal to 0.72, relying on the estimate provided by Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010),
while the persistence in lending relationships, %L, is set equal to 0.85, following again Aliaga-Diaz
and Olivero (2010). However, Section 6 provides sensitivity analysis to the choice of the deep habits
parameters for consumption and lending.
Steady-state values for the tax rates and the persistence parameters of ﬁscal shocks are borrowed
from Fernández-Villaverde (2010) and Monacelli et al. (2010). Therefore, the steady-state tax rate
on sales, τ c, and on labor income, τw, are set to 0.05 and 0.24, respectively, while the persistence
parameters of ﬁscal shocks, ρG and ρX , are set to 0.90, and 0.95, respectively which are also close
to the persistence observed in the data. Steady-state government debt is set equal to zero in steady
state, implying also that the government runs a balanced budget in steady state. In the benchmark
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scenario of lump-sum taxes and balanced budget explored in Section 5 tax rates are constantly
set equal to zero, τCt = τ
W
t = 0, TRt = 0 without loss of generality, and Tt = Gt, such that no
government debt accumulation is allowed. When tax distortion is explored in Section 6, results are
presented using alternative responsiveness parameters of the tax rates to the debt-to-GDP ratio,
ρXB.
The Rotemberg price stickiness parameter, ξ, is set equal to 30, which corresponds to the Calvo
analogue of ﬁrms changing prices almost every three quarters (in the absence of deep habits), as in
Smets and Wouters (2007).9 The Taylor rule parameter is set as in Galí et al. (2007): %pi = 1.5. In
the ﬂexible-price benchmark analyzed in Section 5, ξ = 0, and monetary policy becomes redundant.
The preference parameter, ω , is set to match steady state hours of work equal to 0.44 , as in
Kydland and Prescott (1991). The elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent varieties, η, is set in
order to target a steady state gross mark-up equal to 1.20 as in Christiano et al. (2010).
The elasticity of substitution in the banking sector, ηL, is set in order to match a gross spread
between the lending rate and the risk free rate of 0.005 (200 basis points per year) as in Bernanke
et al. (1999). The same interest rate spread is targeted also by Aksoy et al. (2009) and Aliaga-Diaz
and Olivero (2010). In addition to the explicitly-targeted steady-state values, the above calibration
implies a consumption-output ratio of around 60% and a private investment-output ratio of around
20%.
5 Results in the ﬂexible-price benchmark
This section presents the eﬀect of an expansionary government spending shock (i) in the ﬂexible-price
benchmark model, i.e. the RBC model with monopolistic competition, deep habits in lending, and
balanced budget (FP); and (ii) in the ﬂexible-price benchmark model with deep habits in private
and government consumption (FPDH). With respect to the fully-ﬂedged model outlined in Section
3, this translates into setting θ = ρ = 0 for the FP model; θ = 0.86 and ρ = 0.85 for the FPDH
9Jacob (2010) shows that for a given value of Rotemberg adjustment costs, the introduction of deep habits reduces
the response of prices to the marginal cost and hence it is impossible to compare the deep habits New-Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC) slope to the Calvo analogue. Hence, following Jacob (2010), it is the slope of the standard
forward-looking NKPC that can be interpreted in quarterly terms. Namely, the log-linearized NKPC assumes the
following form: Πˆt = βEtΠˆt+1 + κMˆCt, where κ =
η−1
ξ
under Rotemberg pricing and κ = (1−βξ
c)(1−ξc)
ξc
under Calvo
contracts, where ξc is the Calvo parameter that determines the average quarterly duration of contracts 1
1−ξc . Given
a certain ξ, it is straightforward to induce the implied analogous contract duration in the Calvo world.
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model; and ξ = τ c = τw = ρXB = 0 and Tt = Gt, ∀t for both models.
The empirical evidence provided in Section 2 suggests that an expansionary government spend-
ing shock leads to a fall in the credit spread, to a rise in private consumption, investment, and
lending, and to an initial fall in the real wage, followed by a subsequent increase. Recent empirical
contributions in the ﬁscal literature provide extensive support for the crowding-in eﬀect of govern-
ment spending on private consumption (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Galí et al., 2007; Pappa, 2009;
Monacelli et al., 2010; Fragetta and Melina, 2011). In addition, the increase in hours worked due to
the ﬁscal expansion is generally accompanied by a boost in the real wage (Pappa, 2005; Galí et al.,
2007; Caldara and Kamps, 2008; Pappa, 2009; Fragetta and Melina, 2011). Finally, there is evidence
that the price mark-up drops after an increase in government expenditures (Monacelli and Perotti,
2008; Canova and Pappa, 2011). Figure 4 shows that in the FP model the above-mentioned vari-
ables react in a way opposite to the empirical ﬁndings. The signs of impulse responses ﬂip, matching
empirics, in the FPDH model, i.e. when deep habits in private and government consumption are
activated.
On the size of the government spending multiplier, the empirical literature provides a variety of
results. Recently, Hall (2009) ﬁnds a multiplier of around one. Barro and Redlick (2011) and Ramey
(2009) estimate less-than-one multipliers for defense spending (between 0.5 and 0.7), while Blinder
and Zandi (2010) argue that the general spending multiplier is around 1.5. However, ﬂexible-price
models calibrated for the US economy typically deliver spending multipliers smaller than available
empirical estimates.
In the FP model, when the economy is hit by an expansionary government spending shock, a
negative wealth eﬀect, caused by the absorption of resources by the government, makes consumption
and leisure less aﬀordable, stimulates labor supply and causes a drop in the real wage, while the
price mark-up stays constant by construction. As a result, output increases, but necessarily in a less
than proportional way, as also Woodford (2011) shows from an analytical point of view. In Figure 4
the government spending shock is normalized to 1% of output so that the response of output itself
can be read as a ﬁscal multiplier, at impact equal to around 0.2 in the ﬂexible-price benchmark. In
the credit market, the negative wealth eﬀect aﬀecting households' decision has the consequence of
a drop in the supply of deposits and a subsequent surge in the deposit rate. It follows that banks,
having observed that the availability of funds is shrinking, have an incentive to exploit their current
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Figure 4: A government spending expansion in the ﬂexible-price benchmark with lending relation-
ships (1% of output).
customer base, by raising the loan rate more than proportionally to the increase in the deposit rate,
this resulting in an upswing in the credit spread and a fall in the amount of lending and consequently
of private investment.
In the FPDH model, all the empirical ﬁndings mentioned above are matched. Therefore, deep
habits in private and government consumption are retained in the exercises performed in the remain-
der of the paper as a tool to get facts right. The seminal work by Ravn et al. (2006) demonstrates
that, when deep habits in consumption are introduced into an otherwise standard RBC model, a
government spending expansion yields a crowding-in of consumption as opposed to a crowding out,
an increase in the real wage and a fall in the price mark-up. In the model outlined in this paper,
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this addition also leads to a ﬁscal multiplier of 1.3, a value in the high range of empirical estimates.
The diﬀerences in the transmission mechanism of a ﬁscal shock in a model with deep habits
in consumption work through the fact that the price mark-up is countercyclical under deep habits
even if the model features fully ﬂexible prices. Under deep habits, the mark-up is countercyclical
due to the co-existence of two eﬀects: an intratemporal eﬀect (or price-elasticity eﬀect) and an
intertemporal eﬀect. The intratemporal eﬀect can easily be understood by looking at the demand
faced by an individual ﬁrm i:
ADit = Cit +Git + Iit =
(
Pit,
Pt
)−η
(Xct +X
g
t + It) + θ
(
Scit−1 + S
g
it−1
)
.
The right-hand side of the demand curve is given by the sum of a price-elastic term and a price-
inelastic term. When the habit-adjusted aggregate demand (Xct +X
g
t + It) rises, the weight of the
price-elastic component of demand grows and the price elasticity of demand η˜it ≡ −∂ADit∂pit
pit
ADit
=
η − θ (S
c
it−1+S
g
it−1)
ADit
increases, as opposed to remaining constant and equal to η as in the standard
case (θ = 0). The fact that the elasticity of demand is pro-cyclical is one determinant for the price
mark-up being counter-cyclical. The other determinant comes from the intertemporal eﬀect: the
awareness of higher future sales coupled with the notion that consumers form habit at the variety
level, makes ﬁrms inclined to give up some of the current proﬁts  by temporarily lowering their
mark-up  in order to lock-in new customers and charge them higher mark-ups in the future.
A government spending expansion, also under deep habits, causes a negative wealth eﬀect. How-
ever, the drop in the mark-up, translates into a rise in labor demand stronger than the rise in labor
supply and into a stronger rise in the demand for investment. As a result, the real wage increases
and the demand for investment shifts outward. The increase in the real wage triggers a strong substi-
tution eﬀect away from leisure, which has become relatively more expensive, and into consumption,
hence the crowding-in of the latter. Relative to the FP model, output is allowed to increase by
more, because in the FPDH model hours worked increase by more and hence so does the marginal
product of capital. Banks face a rise in the demand for loans  meant to ﬁnance investment and the
wage bill  and this translates into a higher demand for deposits. This raises both the loan rate and
the deposit rate. However, banks also incorporate the information of high future returns and hence
their prospective ability of making high future proﬁts. This makes them willing to give up some of
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the current proﬁts in order to expand their customer base by locking in more customers into lending
relationships. This results into a temporary fall of the credit spread and an expansion of equilibrium
lending. The impulse responses delivered by the FPDH model show the same sign as the estimated
impulse responses reported in Section 2, although empirical responses are generally hump-shaped.
6 Sensitivity and extensions
This section illustrates a series of modiﬁcations in the FPDH model in order to (i) disentangle the
eﬀects of a number of features of the model and (ii) analyze the robustness of the main results. Sub-
section 6.1 introduces government debt which can be ﬁnanced by either lump-sum or distortionary
taxation (labor income tax or consumption tax). It also shows how the dynamics of the impulse
responses to a government expenditure expansion are aﬀected by diﬀerent degrees of responsiveness
to government debt. Subsection 6.2 shows the sensitivity of the results to the values of the param-
eters measuring the degree of deep habits in consumption and in lending, and to the values of the
persistence parameters of deep habits in consumption and in lending. Subsection 6.3 explores the
robustness of the results to price stickiness and shows the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect.
6.1 Government debt and distortionary taxation
This subsection explores the issue of whether the results presented in Section 5 hold also when the
government ﬁnances its expenditures partly by issuing government bonds and partly by adopting
either lump-sum or distortionary taxation. The benchmark against which diﬀerent model speciﬁca-
tions are compared is the ﬂexible-price benchmark model with deep habits in private and government
consumption (FPDH) discussed in Section 5, which is a model with lump-sum taxes (LS) and a bal-
anced government budget (BB).
Figure 5 illustrates the Ricardian equivalence result according to which, if taxation is not dis-
tortionary, the timing of tax collection necessary to ﬁnance a government expenditure expansion
does not alter the equilibrium as private agents internalize the government budget constraint. The
impulse responses reported are obtained by letting lump-sum taxes react to the government debt-to-
GDP ratio according to feedback rule (19) with diﬀerent calibrations of the responsiveness parameter
%TB, keeping all other sources of taxation oﬀ. The path of the impulse responses is the same as
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Figure 5: A government spending expansion (1% of output) ﬁnanced by government debt and lump-
sum taxes.
in the LS BB model, despite the fact that the accumulation of government debt is clearly more
pronounced if the policy responsiveness is milder.
An analogous exercise consists in comparing impulse responses obtained in a model where the
only sources of ﬁnancing for the government are debt and the labor income tax, the rate of which, τwt ,
evolves according to feedback rule (19) with diﬀerent calibrations of the responsiveness parameter
%τwB. As Figure 6 shows, the dynamics of the impulse responses to a government expenditure
expansion are aﬀected by the introduction of the labor income tax and by the strength with which
tax rate τwt responds to the government debt-to-GDP ratio, compared to the LS BB case. In
particular, feedback rule (19) implies on one hand that tax rate τwt reacts to the debt-to-GDP ratio;
on the other hand the reaction is delayed by the presence of the smoothing component. The latter,
for some quarters, leads to a slight stronger increase in hours worked compared to the LS BB case,
as agents are aware that the tax rate increases with a delay relative to the rise in debt-to-GDP. Via
the marginal product of capital and loan demand, investment and lending show similar patterns.
The impact output multiplier is marginally aﬀected. After some quarters, however, hours of work
decline by more relative to the LS BB case due to (i) higher intertemporal substitution of the labor
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Figure 6: A government spending expansion (1% of output) ﬁnanced by government debt and the
labor income tax.
supply (as agents anticipate that in the long run the tax rate will converge back to its steady-state
value); and (ii) intratemporal substitution of consumption with leisure, the latter being relatively
more aﬀordable. The drop of private consumption after the initial crowding-in is bigger than the LS
BB case, both due to the negative income eﬀect caused by the increase in the tax rate and by the
mentioned substitution eﬀects. The higher %τwB, the bigger are these eﬀects, which in turn translate
into a stronger subsequent fall in output. A stronger decrease in hours worked is mirrored also in a
stronger decline in investment and lending due to the fact that, from the supply side of the credit
market, lower households' income leads to a fall in the ﬁnancial resources being deposited; from the
demand side, a lower level of hours worked translates into a lower marginal product of capital and
a lower investment and loan demand. Despite the altered dynamics, the main empirical regularities
matched by the FPDH model with LS and BB, including the fall in the credit spread, are robust
to the introduction of the labor income tax and government debt, both with a mild response to
the debt-to-GDP ratio (%τwB = 0.05, which leaves the ratio well above steady state also after 20
quarters); and with a strong response (%τwB = 0.5, which brings it to zero in less than 15 quarters).
Finally, Figure 7 reports the case in which the sources of ﬁnancing for the government are debt
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Figure 7: A government spending expansion (1% of output) ﬁnanced by government debt and the
consumption tax.
and the consumption tax, the rate of which, τ ct , also evolves according to feedback rule (19) with
diﬀerent calibrations of the responsiveness parameter %τcB. Analogously to what happens when
government expenditure is ﬁnanced via labor income tax, the dynamics of the impulse responses to
a government expenditure expansion are aﬀected by the introduction of τ ct and by the magnitude of
%τcB, compared to the LS BB case. Namely, as the tax rate responds more aggressively to debt-to-
GDP, i.e. it increases more, the substitution of consumption with leisure becomes stronger, making
consumption and hours worked decrease by more, after their initial increase. The main empirical
regularities matched by the FPDH model with LS and BB are robust also to the introduction of the
consumption tax and diﬀerent responsiveness to government debt.
6.2 Sensitivity to deep habits
This subsection shows the sensitivity of the results reported in Section 5 to the values of the param-
eters measuring the degree of deep habits in consumption, θ, and in lending, θL; and the persistence
of deep habits in consumption, %, and in lending, %L. Remaining parameters are calibrated as in the
ﬂexible-price benchmark model speciﬁcation as in Section 5.
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of output and credit spread to deep habits in consumption and deep habits in
lending. Impact responses to a government spending expansion of 1% of output.
Figure 8 shows the impact responses of output and the credit spread to a government spending
expansion (i) at diﬀerent degrees of deep habits in consumption and (ii) at diﬀerent degrees of deep
habits in lending. The chart on the right-hand side shows that when deep habits in lending are
oﬀ, i.e. θL = 0, the impact response of the credit spread is zero at any value of deep habits in
consumption, since the removal of deep habits in lending eliminates the eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions
and implies a constant spread by construction. As long as θ = 0, if θL > 0, the credit spread increases
after an expansionary government spending shock as explained in Section 5. As θL increases, the
positive eﬀect on the credit spread is magniﬁed. At any given positive θL, the impact response of the
credit spread declines as the degree of deep habits in consumption, θ, increases, becoming negative
for θ ≥ 0.7. As both θ and θL become large, the eﬀects stemming (i) from stronger countercyclical
movements in the price mark-up (due to stronger deep habit formation in consumption)  which
boosts investment to a greater extent  and (ii) from stronger lending relationships  which make
banks' future proﬁts relatively more valuable than current proﬁts  act into the same direction
towards a stronger drop in the credit spread. The chart on the left-hand side shows that when deep
habits in consumption and in lending are both oﬀ, the value of the impact output multiplier is of
the order of 0.2. The higher the degree of deep habits in consumption the greater is the output
multiplier for any given value of the degree of deep habits in lending. For θ < 0.7, higher values
of θL are associated with a reduction in the output multiplier, driven by the positive eﬀect on the
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Figure 9: Sensitivity of mark-up to consumption habit persistence and of credit spread to the
persistence of lending relationships. Responses to a government spending expansion of 1% of output.
credit spread. For θ ≥ 0.7, higher values of θL lead to increased output multipliers, consistently
with the negative impact response of the credit spread that causes a larger expansion in lending.
The ampliﬁcation of the shocks when lending relationships are on is justiﬁed by the presence
of an endogenous spread. The change in the spread leads to a greater change in lending and,
therefore, investment and labor. This mechanism reinforces the increase in output, amplifying the
expansionary eﬀects of a government spending expansion. This ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect is even
more pronounced in the sticky price version of the model presented in Subsection 6.3. However,
Figure 8 clearly shows that the magnitude of the impact output multiplier is mainly driven by the
degree of deep habits in consumption.
Sensitivity of the results to the choice of the parameters measuring consumption habit persis-
tence, %, and the persistence of lending relationships, %L, is shown in Figures 9 and 10. Figure 9
shows the impulse responses for the ﬁrst 20 quarters (i) of the mark-up at diﬀerent values of ρ; and
(ii) of the credit spread at diﬀerent values of %L. When deep habits in consumption or in lending
last for only one quarter, i.e. % = 0 or %L = 0, the negative impact responses of the mark-up or of
the credit spread are substantially magniﬁed. In this case, ﬁnal good ﬁrms or banks reduce their
respective mark-ups  i.e. the price mark-up or the credit spread  to a greater extent in order
to lock in as many of their customers as possible in ﬁrm-to-customer relationships. These, in fact,
can be exploited for only one quarter, during which their customers are charged larger mark-ups.
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Figure 10: Sensitivity of output and credit spread to consumption habit persistence and the per-
sistence of lending relationships. Impact responses to a government spending expansion of 1% of
output.
After that, mark-ups quickly return to their respective steady state. An increasingly higher persis-
tence leads to a lower ampliﬁcation and, at the same time, to a greater duration of the propagation
mechanism of a government spending expansion.
Figure 10 shows the impact responses of output and the credit spread to a government spending
expansion (i) at diﬀerent degrees of consumption habit persistence and (ii) at diﬀerent degrees of the
persistence of lending relationships. The chart on the right-hand side shows that when % = %L = 0,
the negative eﬀect on the credit spread is substantially magniﬁed as the mechanisms discussed above
and reported in Figure 9 take place at the same time. Therefore, sensitivity analysis to the values of
% and %L reveals that the sign of the impact response of the credit spread to a government spending
shock is robust to any choice of the persistence parameters. The magnitude is even ampliﬁed if
lower degrees of persistence are assumed. The left-hand side of Figure 10 shows that the lower the
persistence parameters, the higher the impact output multiplier due to stronger reductions both
in the price mark-up and in the credit spread. The reduction that the impact output multiplier
experiences when %L increases, at a given ρ, is lower than the reduction that takes place when %
increases for any given ρL. This can be explained by the fact that a decrease in the persistence
of lending relationships causes a greater fall in the impact response of the credit spread, relative
to the fall in the impact response of the price mark-up when the consumption habit persistence is
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decreased by the same amount.
6.3 Sticky prices and ﬁnancial accelerator
This subsection explores (i) the issue of whether the introduction of sticky prices changes the results
of the model presented in Section 5 and (ii) the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect in the sticky-price version
of the model.
Figure 11 shows the impact responses of the main macro variables to a government spending
expansion of 1% of output (i) at diﬀerent degrees of deep habits in consumption, θ, and (ii) at
diﬀerent degrees of price stickiness, ξ. Even in absence of deep habits in consumption, the presence
of price stickiness generates a countercyclical response of the price mark-up and an increase in the
real wage after an expansionary government spending shock, as standard in the NK models (e.g.
Pappa, 2009). However, the moderate decline in the price mark-up is not able to generate the
crowding-in eﬀects on consumption and investment. As a consequence, price stickiness alone is not
able to reproduce the empirical ﬁnding presented in Section 2 that the credit spread declines in
response to a government spending expansion.
A government spending expansion, being a demand shock, in general yields an increase in the
rate of inﬂation. However, for high values of θ, an increase in the degree of price stickiness give
rise to non-monotonic changes in the rate of inﬂation. In fact, high degrees of deep habits induce a
strong decline in the price markup that makes the aggregate supply shift outward to a larger extent,
thus reducing the inﬂationary pressure exerted by the government expenditure expansion.10 From
a quantitative point of view, higher degrees of price stickiness lead to higher output multipliers. If
coupled with higher degrees of deep habits in consumption the model in general yields analogous,
though ampliﬁed, results to those obtained in the ﬂexible-price benchmark of Section 5.11
10Cantore et al. (2011) show that, at suﬃciently high levels of deep habits, inﬂation may also fall in response to a
government spending expansion.
11Jacob (2010) argues that the introduction of price stickiness reduces the downward pressure of the government
spending expansion on the mark-up in the presence of deep habits, nullifying the desirable eﬀects on macro variables
such as the real wage or private consumption, which provide a bridge between empirical ﬁndings and theoretical DSGE
models. However, Cantore et al. (2011) show that Jacob's result is driven by the assumption that the monetary policy
rate reacts to the output gap, not merely by the introduction of sticky prices. In this paper, due to the presence of the
cost channel, dealing with Taylor rule speciﬁcations that imply a reaction to the output gap is more problematic. In
fact, here, the marginal cost also depends on the nominal interest rate and this aﬀects the impact and the transmission
of monetary policy as movements in the interest rate inﬂuence both the demand side and the supply side of the model.
For instance, Surico (2008) shows that in a NK model augmented with the cost channel, if the Taylor rule includes a
reaction coeﬃcient to the output gap, the region of indeterminacy increases. Aksoy et al. (2009) provide an analysis of
how the region of determinacy changes in a sticky price model augmented with a cost channel and lending relationships.
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Figure 11: Sensitivity to deep habits in consumption and the degree of price stickiness. Impact
responses to a government spending expansion of 1% of output.
Figure 12 explores the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect in the transmission of the government spending
expansion in the sticky-price version of the model. In particular, it shows the impact responses of
output, investment, hours worked and the spread to diﬀerent degrees of deep habits in lending, θL,
when ξ = 30  which corresponds to Calvo contracts that last almost 3 quarters, as explained in
Section 4  and deep habits in consumption are activated (so that the the negative response of the
credit spread is matched). If θL = 0, the model is not able to capture the borrower's hold-up eﬀect
and the credit spread becomes constant by construction. In other words, ﬁnancial frictions modeled
The interaction of ﬁscal policy with alternative monetary policies and the issue of indeterminacy goes beyond the
scope of this paper and is left for future research.
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Figure 12: Impact responses to a government spending expansion of 1% of output for diﬀerent
degrees of deep habit in lending.
in the form of lending relationships are removed. When θL > 0, the model exhibits a ﬁnancial
accelerator eﬀect. The ampliﬁcation of the shock when lending relationships are on is driven by
the presence of an endogenous spread. The current demand for credit is now a function of past
borrowing levels. The higher the degree of deep habits in lending, the higher is the willingness of the
banks to give up some of their current proﬁts in order to expand their customer base by locking in
more customers into lending relationships that will be exploited in the following periods. Thus, the
increasing reduction of the spread allows a greater expansion in lending and, therefore, investment
and labor. This mechanism reinforces the increase in output, amplifying the expansionary eﬀects of
the government spending shock. The ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect is present in similar fashion to other
models embedding ﬁnancial frictions, such as Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG) and its application to
ﬁscal policy done by Fernández-Villaverde (2010). However, the model setup and the ampliﬁcation
36
mechanism here are diﬀerent. In the BGG class of models, the introduction of the credit market
contributes to amplifying the shocks hitting the economy because of the link between the external
ﬁnance premium (EFP) and the net worth of potential borrowers, which is the source of ﬁnancial
frictions.12 As explained above, in lending relationships model ﬁnancial frictions arise because of
the borrower's hold-up eﬀect.
7 Conclusion
The empirical evidence provided in this paper suggests that the credit spread responds negatively
to an expansionary government spending shock, while consumption, investment, and lending in-
crease. A DSGE model where the credit spread is endogenized via the inclusion of a banking sector
exploiting lending relationships does not mimic such ﬁndings. However, the introduction of deep
habits in private and government consumption considerably improves the performance of the model
in replicating empirics. In fact, with this addition, the model is able to match not only the empiri-
cally veriﬁed relationship between the credit spread and government spending shocks, but also the
crowding-in eﬀect on consumption and investment as well as the decline in the price mark-up.
Sensitivity checks and extensions show that core results hold for a number of model calibrations
and speciﬁcations. The model also exhibits a ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect, since the presence of banks
exploiting lending relationships ampliﬁes the eﬀect of expansionary government spending shocks.
New-Keynesian features coupled with the cost channel of monetary policy and distortionary taxation
give rise to determinacy issues, which are left for future research.
12The EFP is the diﬀerence between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds internal to
the entrepreneur. When borrowers have little wealth to contribute to the project ﬁnancing, the potential divergence
of interests between borrowers and lenders (the suppliers of external funds) is greater and, therefore, agency costs
increase. In equilibrium, lenders must be compensated for higher agency costs by a larger EFP. As a result, the EFP
depends inversely on borrowers' net worth. The pro-cyclicality of borrowers' net worth implies a counter-cyclical EFP;
therefore, this mechanism enhances the swings in borrowing. This, in turn, aﬀects investment and output.
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